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ABSTRACT
Recent applications of Stackelberg Security Games (SSG), from
wildlife crime to urban crime, have employed machine learning
tools to learn and predict adversary behavior using available data
about defender-adversary interactions. Given these recent develop-
ments, this paper commits to an approach of directly learning the
response function of the adversary. Using the PAC model, this pa-
per lays a firm theoretical foundation for learning in SSGs (e.g.,
theoretically answer questions about the numbers of samples re-
quired to learn adversary behavior) and provides utility guaran-
tees when the learned adversary model is used to plan the de-
fender’s strategy. The paper also aims to answer practical ques-
tions such as how much more data is needed to improve an ad-
versary model’s accuracy. Additionally, we explain a recently ob-
served phenomenon that prediction accuracy of learned adversary
behavior is not enough to discover the utility maximizing defender
strategy. We provide four main contributions: (1) a PAC model
of learning adversary response functions in SSGs; (2) PAC-model
analysis of the learning of key, existing bounded rationality models
in SSGs; (3) an entirely new approach to adversary modeling based
on a non-parametric class of response functions with PAC-model
analysis and (4) identification of conditions under which comput-
ing the best defender strategy against the learned adversary behav-
ior is indeed the optimal strategy. Finally, we conduct experiments
with real-world data from a national park in Uganda, showing the
benefit of our new adversary modeling approach and verification of
our PAC model predictions.
1. INTRODUCTION
Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) are arguably the best exam-
ple of the application of the Stackelberg game model in the real
world. Indeed, numerous successful deployed applications [29]
(LAX airport, US air marshal) and extensive research on related
topics [5, 17, 11] provide evidence about the generality of the
SSG framework. More recently, new application domains of SSGs,
from wildlife crime to urban crime, are accompanied by significant
amounts of past data of recorded defender strategies and adversary
reactions. This has enabled the learning of adversary behavior from
such data [35, 34]. Also, analysis of these datasets and human sub-
ject experiment studies [25] have revealed that modeling bounded
rationality of the adversary enables the defender to further opti-
mize her allocation of limited security resources. Thus, learning
the adversary’s bounded rational behavior and computing defender
strategy based on the learned model has become an important area
of research in SSGs.
However, without a theoretical foundation for this learning and
strategic planning problem, many issues that arise in practice can-
not be explained or addressed. For example, it has been recently ob-
served that in spite of good prediction accuracy of the learned mod-
els of adversary behavior, the performance of the defender strategy
that is computed against this learned adversary model is poor [10].
A formal study could also answer several other important questions
that arise in practice, for example, (1) How many samples would be
required to learn a “reasonable” model of adversary behavior in a
given SSG? (2) What utility bound can be provided when deploy-
ing the best defender strategy that is computed against the learned
adversary model?
Motivated by the learning of adversary behavior from data in re-
cent applications [12, 35], we adopt the framework in which the de-
fender first learns the response function of the adversary (adversary
behavior) and then optimizes against the learned response. This
paper is the first theoretical study of the adversary bounded ratio-
nal behavior learning problem and the optimality guarantees (utility
bounds) when computing the best defender strategies against such
learned behaviors. Indeed, unlike past theoretical work on learn-
ing in SSGs (see related work) where reasoning about adversary
response happens through payoff and rationality, we treat the re-
sponse of the bounded rational adversary as the object to be learned.
Our first contribution is using the Probably Approximately Cor-
rect (PAC) model [15, 2] to analyze the learning problem at hand. A
PAC analysis yields sample complexity, i.e., the number of samples
required to achieve a given level of learning guarantee. Hence, the
PAC analysis allows us to address the question of required quan-
tity of samples raised earlier. While PAC analysis is fairly standard
for classifiers and real valued functions (i.e., regression) it is not
an out-of-the-box approach. In particular, PAC-model analysis of
SSGs brings to the table significant new challenges. To begin with,
given that we are learning adversary response functions, we must
deal with the output being a probability distribution over the adver-
sary’s actions, i.e., these response functions are vector-valued. We
appeal to the framework of Haussler [13] to study the PAC learn-
ability of vector-valued response functions. For SSGs, we first pose
the learning problem in terms of maximizing the likelihood of see-
ing the attack data, but without restricting the formulation to any
particular class of response functions. This general PAC frame-
work for learning adversary behavior in SSGs enables the rest of
the analysis in this paper.
Our second contribution is an analysis of the SUQR model of
bounded rationality adversary behavior used in SSGs, which posits
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a class of parametrized response functions with a given number of
parameters (and corresponding features). SUQR is the best known
model of bounded rationality in SSGs, resulting in multiple de-
ployed applications [12, 9]. In analyzing SUQR, we advance the
state-of-the-art in the mathematical techniques involved in PAC
analysis of vector-valued function spaces. In particular, we pro-
vide a technique to obtain sharper sample complexity for SUQR
than simply directly applying Haussler’s original techniques. We
decompose the given SUQR function space into two (or more)
parts, performing PAC analysis of each part and finally combin-
ing the results to obtain the sample complexity result (which scales
as T log T with T targets) for SUQR (see details in Section 5).
Our third contribution includes an entirely new behavioral model
specified by the non-parametric Lipschitz (NPL) class of response
functions for SSGs, where the only restriction on NPL functions
is Lipschitzness. The NPL approach makes very few assumptions
about the response function, enabling the learning of a multitude of
behaviors albeit at the cost of higher sample complexity. As NPL
has never been explored in learning bounded rationality models in
SSGs, we provide a novel learning technique for NPL. We also
compute the sample complexity for NPL. Further, we observe in
our experiments that the power to capture a large variety of behav-
iors enables NPL to perform better than SUQR with the real-world
data from Queen Elizabeth National Park (QENP) in Uganda.
Our fourth contribution is to convert the PAC learning guaran-
tee into a bound on the utility derived by the defender when plan-
ning her strategy based on the learned adversary behavior model.
In the process, we make explicit the assumptions required from
the dataset of adversary’s attacks in response to deployed defender
mixed strategies in order to discover the optimal (w.r.t. utility) de-
fender strategy. These assumptions help explain a puzzling phe-
nomenon observed in recent literature on learning in SSGs [10]—
in particular that learned adversary behaviors provide good predic-
tion accuracy, but the best defender strategy computed against such
learned behavior may not perform well in practice. The key is that
the dataset for learning must not simply record a large number of
attacks against few defender strategies but rather contain the at-
tacker’s response against a variety of defender mixed strategies. We
discuss the details of our assumptions and its implications for the
strategic choice of defender’s actions in Section 7.
We also conduct experiments with real-world poaching data
from the QENP in Uganda (obtained from [24]) and data collected
from human subject experiments. The experimental results sup-
port our theoretical conclusions about the number of samples re-
quired for different learning techniques. Showing the value of our
new NPL approach, the NPL approach outperforms all existing ap-
proaches in predicting the poaching activity in QENP. Finally, our
work opens up a number of exciting research directions, such as
studying learning of behavioral models in active learning setting
and real-world application of non-parametric models. 1
2. RELATEDWORK
Learning and planning in SSGs with rational adversaries has
been studied in two recent papers [6, 3], and in Stackelberg games
by Letchford et al. [19] and Marecki et al. [21]. All these papers
study the learning problem under an active learning framework,
where the defender can choose the strategy to deploy within the
learning process. Also, all these papers study the setting with per-
fectly rational adversaries. Our work differs as we study bounded
rational adversaries in a passive learning scenario (i.e., with given
1Due to lack of space, some proofs in this paper are in the online
Appendix: http://bit.ly/1l4n3s1
data) and once the model is learned we analyze the guarantees of
planning against the learned model. Also, our focus on SSGs dif-
ferentiates us from recent work on PAC learnability in co-operative
games [4], in which the authors study PAC learnability of the value
function of coalitions with perfectly rational players. Also, our
work is orthogonal to adversarial learning [32], which studies game
theoretic models of an adversary attacking a learning algorithm.
PAC learning model has a very rich and extensive body of
work [2]. The PAC model provides a theoretical underpinning
for most standard machine learning techniques. We use the PAC
framework of Haussler [13]. For the parametric case, we derive
sharp sample complexity bounds based on covering numbers using
our techniques rather than bounding it using the standard technique
of pseudo-dimension [27] or fat shattering dimension [2]. For the
NPL case we use results from [31] along with our technique of
bounding the mixed strategy space of the defender; these results
[31] have also been used in the study of Lipschitz classifiers [20]
but we differ as our hypothesis functions are real vector-valued.
3. SSG PRELIMINARIES
This section introduces the background and preliminary nota-
tions for SSGs. A summary of notations used in this paper is pre-
sented in Table 1. An SSG is a two player Stackelberg game be-
tween a defender (leader) and an adversary (follower) [26]. The
defender wishes to protect T targets with a limited number of se-
curity resources K (K << T ). For ease of presentation, we
restrict ourselves to the scenario with no scheduling constraints
(see Korzhyk et al. [17]). The defender’s pure strategy is to al-
locate each resource to a target. A defender’s mixed-strategy x˜
(∀j ∈ P. x˜j ∈ [0, 1],∑Pj=1 x˜j = 1) is then defined as a
probability distribution over the set of all possible pure strategies
P . An equivalent description (see Korzhyk et al. [17]) of these
mixed strategies are coverage probabilities over the set of targets:
x (∀i ∈ T. xi ∈ [0, 1],∑Ti=1 xi ≤ K). We refer to this latter
description as the mixed strategy of the defender.
A pure strategy of the adversary is defined as attacking a single
target. The adversary’s mixed strategy is then a categorical distribu-
tion over the set of targets. Thus, it can be expressed as parameters
qi (i ∈ T ) of a categorical distribution such that 0 ≤ qi ≤ 1 and∑
i qi = 1. The adversary’s response to the defender’s mixed strat-
egy is given by a function q : X → Q, where Q is the space of
all mixed strategies of the adversary. The matrix U specifies the
payoffs of the defender, and her expected utility is xTUq(x) when
she plays a mixed strategy x ∈ X .
Bounded Rationality Models: We discuss the SUQR model
and its representation for the analysis in this paper below. Build-
ing on prior work on quantal response [23], SUQR [25] states that
given n actions, a human player plays action i with probability
qi ∝ ew·v , where v denotes a vector of feature values for choice i
and w denotes the weight parameters for these features. The model
is equivalent to conditional logistic regression [22]. The features
are specific to the domain, e.g., in case of SSG applications, the set
of features include the coverage probability xi, the reward Ri and
penalty Pi of target i. Since, other than the coverage x, remaining
features are fixed for each target in real world data, we assume a
target-specific feature ci (which may be a linear combination of re-
wards and penalties) and analyze the following generalized2 form
of SUQR with parameters w1 and ci’s: qi(x) ∝ ew1xi+ci . As
2This general form is harder to analyze than the standard SUQR
form in which the exponent function (function of xi, Ri, Pi) for all
qi is same: w1xi+w2Ri+w3Pi. For completeness, we derive the
results for the standard SUQR form in the Appendix.
Notation Meaning
T,K Number of targets, defender resources
dlp(o, o
′) lp distance between points o, o′
d¯lp(o, o
′) Average lp distance: = dlp(o, o
′)/n
X Instance space (defender mixed strategies)
Y Outcome space (attacked target)
A Decision space
h ∈ H h : X → A is the hypothesis function
N (,H, d) -cover of setH using distance d
C(,H, d) capacity ofH using distance d
rh(p), rˆh(~z) true risk, empirical risk of hypothesis h
dL1(P,d)(f, g) L1 distance between functions f, g
qp(x) parameters of true attack distribution
qh(x) parameters of attack distr. predicted by h
Table 1: Notations∑T
i=1 qi(x) = 1, we have:
qi(x) =
ew1xi+ci∑T
j=1 e
w1xj+cj
.
Equivalent Alternate Representation: For ease of mathematical
proofs, using standard techniques in logistic regression, we take
qT ∝ e0, and hence, qi ∝ ew1(xi−xT )+(ci−cT ). To shorten no-
tation, let ciT = ci − cT , xiT = xi − xT . By multiplying the
numerator and denominator by ew1xT+cT , it can be verified that
qi(x) =
ew1xiT+ciT
e0+
∑T−1
j=1 e
w1xjT+cjT
= e
w1xi+ci∑T
j=1 e
w1xj+cj
.
4. LEARNING FRAMEWORK FOR SSG
First, we introduce some notations: given two n-dimensional
points o and o′, the lp distance dlp between the two points is:
dlp(o, o
′) = ||o − o′||p = (∑ni=1 |oi − o′i|p)1/p. In particular,
dl∞(o, o
′) = ||o − o′||∞ = maxi |oi − o′i|. Also, d¯lp = dlp/n.
KL denotes the Kullback-Leibler divergence [18].
We use the learning framework of Haussler [13], which includes
an instance space X and outcome space Y . In our context, X is
same as the space of defender mixed strategies x ∈ X . Outcome
space Y is defined as the space of all possible categorical choices
over a set of T targets (i.e., choice of target to attack) for the ad-
versary. Let ti denote the attacker’s choice to attack the ith target.
More formally ti = 〈t1i , . . . , tTi 〉, where tji = 1 for j = i and
otherwise 0. Thus, Y = {t1, . . . , tT }. We will use y to denote
any general element of Y . To give an example, given three targets
T1, T2 and T3, Y = {t1, t2, t3} = {〈1, 0, 0〉, 〈0, 1, 0〉, 〈0, 0, 1〉},
where t1 denotes 〈1, 0, 0〉, i.e., it denotes that T1 was attacked
while T2 and T3 were not attacked, and so on. The training data
are samples drawn from Z = X × Y using an unknown prob-
ability distribution, say given by density p(x, y). Each training
data point (x, y) denotes the adversary’s response y ∈ Y (e.g.,
t1 or attack on target 1) to a particular defender mixed strategy
x ∈ X . The density p also determines the true attacker behavior
qp(x) which stands for the conditional probabilities of the attacker
attacking a target given x so that qp(x) = 〈qp1(x), . . . , qpT (x)〉,
where qpi (x) = p(ti|x).
Haussler [13] also defines a decision spaceA, a space of hypoth-
esis (functions) H with elements h : X → A and a loss function
l : Y ×A→ R. The hypothesis h outputs values in A that enables
computing (probabilistic) predictions of the actual outcome. The
loss function l captures the loss when the real outcome is y ∈ Y
and the prediction of possible outcomes happens using a ∈ A.
Example 1: Generalized SUQR For the parametric represen-
tation of generalized SUQR in the previous section and consider-
ing our 3-target example above, H contains vector valued func-
tions with (T − 1) = 2 components that form the exponents of
the numerator of prediction probabilities q1 and q2. H contains
two components, since the third component q3 is proportional to
e0 as discussed above. That is, H contains functions of the form:
〈w1(x1 − x3) + c13, w1(x2 − x3) + c23〉; ∀x ∈ X . Also, A
is the range of the functions in H, i.e., A ⊂ R2. Then, given
h(x) = 〈a1, a2〉, the prediction probabilities qh1 (x), qh2 (x), qh3 (x)
are given by qhi (x) = e
ai
1+ea1+ea2
(assume a3 = 0).
PAC learnability: The learning algorithm aims to learn a h ∈ H
that minimizes the true risk of using the hypothesis h. The true
risk rh(p) of a particular hypothesis (predictor) h, given density
function p(x, y) overZ = X×Y , is the expected loss of predicting
h(x) when the true outcome is y:
rh(p) =
∫
p(x, y)l(y, h(x)) dx dy
Of course, as p is unknown the true risk cannot be computed.
However, given (enough) samples from p, the true risk can be es-
timated by the empirical risk. The empirical risk rˆh(~z), where
~z is a sequence of m training samples from Z, is defined as:
rˆh(~z) = 1/m
∑m
i=1 l(yi, h(xi)). Let h
∗ be the hypothesis that
minimizes the true risk, i.e., rh∗(p) = inf{rh(p) | h ∈ H} and
let hˆ∗ be the hypothesis that minimizes the empirical risk, i.e.,
rˆhˆ∗(~z) = inf{rˆh(~z) | h ∈ H}. The following is the well-known
PAC learning result [2] for any empirical risk minimizing (ERM)
algorithm A yielding hypothesis A(~z):
If Pr(∀h ∈ H.|rˆh(~z)− rh(p)| < α/3) > 1− δ/2
and Pr(|rˆA(~z)(~z)− rˆhˆ∗(~z)| < α/3) > 1− δ/2
then Pr(|rA(~z)(p)− rh∗(p)| < α) > 1− δ
The final result states that output hypothesis A(~z) has true risk α-
close to the lowest true risk inH attained by h∗ with high probabil-
ity 1−δ over the choice of training samples. The first pre-condition
states that it must be the case that for all h ∈ H the difference be-
tween empirical risk and true risk is α
3
-close with high probability
1− δ
2
. The second pre-condition states that the output A(~z) of the
ERM algorithmA should have empirical risk α
3
-close to the lowest
empirical risk of hˆ∗ with high probability 1− δ
2
. A hypothesis class
H is called (α, δ)-PAC learnable if there exists an ERM algorithm
A such that H and A satisfy the two pre-conditions. In this work,
our empirical risk minimizing algorithms find hˆ∗ exactly (upto pre-
cision of convex solvers, see Section 6), thus, satisfying the second
pre-condition; hence, we will focus more on the first pre-condition.
As the empirical risk estimate gets better with increasing samples,
a minimum number of samples are required to ensure that the first
pre-condition holds (see Theorem 1). Hence we can relate (α, δ)-
PAC learnability to the number of samples.
Modeling security games: Having given an example for general-
ized SUQR, we systematically model learning of adversary behav-
ior in SSGs using the PAC framework for any hypothesis class H.
We assume certain properties of functions h ∈ H that we present
below. First, the vector valued function h ∈ H takes the form
h(x) = 〈h1(x), . . . , hT−1(x)〉.
Thus, A is the product space A1 × . . . , AT−1. Each hi(x) is
assumed to take values between [−M
2
, M
2
], where M >> 1,
which implies Ai = [−M2 , M2 ]. The prediction probabilities in-
duced by any h is qh(x) = 〈qh1 (x), . . . , qhT (x)〉, where qhi (x) =
ehi(x)
1+
∑
i e
hi(x)
(assume hT (x) = 0). Next, we specify two classes
of functions that we analyze in later sections. We choose these two
functions classes because (1) the first function class represents the
widely used SUQR model in literature [25, 34] and (2) the second
function class is very flexible as it capture a wide range of functions
and only imposes minimal Lipschitzness constraints to ensure that
the functions are well behaved (e.g., continuous).
Parametric H: In this approach we model generalized SUQR.
Generalizing from Example 1, the functions h ∈ H take a paramet-
ric form where each component function is hi(x) = w1xiT + ciT .
Non-parametric Lipschitz (NPL) H: Here, the only restriction
we impose on functions h ∈ H is that each component function hi
is L-Lipschitz where L ≤ Kˆ, for given and fixed constant Kˆ. We
show later (Lemma 7) that this implies that qh is Lipschitz also.
Next, given the stochastic nature of the adversary’s attacks, we
use a loss function (same for parametric and NPL) such that mini-
mizing the empirical risk is equivalent to maximizing the likelihood
of seeing the attack data. The loss function l : Y × A → R for
actual outcome ti is defined as:
l(ti, a) = − log
(
eai/1 +
T−1∑
j=1
eaj
)
. (1)
It can be readily inferred that minimizing the empirical risk (recall
rˆh(~z) = 1/m
∑m
i=1 l(yi, h(xi))) is equivalent to maximizing the
log likelihood of the training data.
5. SAMPLE COMPLEXITY
In this section we derive the sample complexity for the paramet-
ric and NPL case, which provides an indication about the amount
of data required to learn the adversary behavior. First, we present
a general result about sample complexity bounds for any H, given
our loss l. This result relies on sample complexity results in [13].
The bound depends on the capacity C of H, which we define after
the theorem. The bound also assumes an ERM algorithm which we
present for our models in Section 6.
THEOREM 1. Assume that the hypothesis space H is permis-
sible3. Let the data be generated by m independent draws from
X × Y according to p. Then, assuming existence of an ERM algo-
rithm and given our loss l defined in Eq. 1, the least m required to
ensure (α, δ)-PAC learnability is (recall d¯l1 is average l1 distance)
576M2
α2
(
log
1
δ
+ log
(
8C( α
96T
,H, d¯l1)
))
PROOF SKETCH. Haussler [13] present a result of the above
form using a general distance metric defined on the space A for
any loss function l:
ρ(a, b) = max
y∈Y
|l(y, a)− l(y, b)|
The main effort in this proof is relating ρ to d¯l1 for our choice
of the loss function l given by Equation 1. We are able to show
that ρ(a, b) ≤ 2T d¯l1(a, b) for our loss function. Our result then
follows from this relation (details in Appendix).
The above sample complexity result is stated in terms of the
capacity C(α/96T,H, d¯l1). Thus, in order to obtain the sample
complexity of the generalized SUQR and NPL function spaces we
need to compute the capacity of these function spaces. Therefore,
in the rest of this section we will focus on computing capacity
C(α/96T,H, d¯l1) for both the generalized SUQR and NPL hy-
pothesis space. First, we need to define capacity C of functions
spaces, for which we start by defining the covering number N of
function spaces. Let d be a pseudo metric for the set H. For any
 > 0, an -cover for H is a finite set F ⊆ H such that for any
3As noted in Haussler: “This is a measurability condition defined in
Pollard (1984) which need not concern us in practice.”
h ∈ H there is a f ∈ F with d(f, h) ≤ , i.e., any element in H
is at least -close to some element of the cover F . The covering
number N (,H, d) denotes the size of the smallest -cover for set
H (for the pseudo metric d). We now proceed to define a pseudo
metric dL1(P,d) onH with respect to any probability measure P on
X and any given pseudo-metric d on A. This pseudo-metric is the
expected (over P ) distance (with d) between the output of f and g.
dL1(P,d)(f, g) =
∫
X
d(f(x), g(x)) dP (x) ∀f, g ∈ H
Then, N (,H, dL1(P,d)) is the covering number for H for the
pseudo metric dL1(P,d). However, to be more general, the capacity
of function spaces provides a “distribution-free” notion of covering
number. The capacity C(,H, d) is:
C(,H, d) = sup
P
{N (,H, dL1(P,d))}
Capacity of vector valued function: The function spaces (both
parametric and NPL) we consider are vector valued. Haussler [13]
provides an useful technique to bound the capacity for vector val-
ued function space H in terms of the capacity of each of the
component real valued function space. Given k functions spaces
H1, . . . ,Hk with functions from X to Ai, he define the free
product function space ×iHi with functions from X to A =
A1 × . . . Ak as ×iHi = {〈h1, . . . , hk〉 | hi ∈ Hi}, where
〈h1, . . . , hk〉(x) = 〈h1(x), . . . , hk(x)〉. He shows that:
C(,×iHi, d¯l1) <
k∏
i=1
C(,Hi, dl1) (2)
Unfortunately, a straightforward application of the above result
does not give as tight bounds for capacity in the parametric case
as the novel direct sum decomposition of function spaces approach
we use in the sub-section. Even for the NPL case where the above
result is used we still need to compute C(,Hi, dl1) for each com-
ponent function spaceHi.
5.1 Parametric case: Generalized SUQR
Recall that the hypothesis function h has T −1 component func-
tions w1xiT +ciT . However, the same weight w1 in all component
functions implies that H is not a free product of component func-
tion spaces, hence we cannot use Equation 2 directly. However,
if we consider the space of functions, say H′, in which the ith
component function space H′i is given by wixiT + ciT (note wi
can be different for each i) then we can use Equation 2 to bound
C(,H′, d¯l1). Also, the fact that H ⊂ H′ allows upper bound-
ing C(,H, d¯l1) by C(,H′, d¯l1). But, this approach results in a
weaker T log(T
α
log T
α
) bound (detailed derivation using this ap-
proach is in Appendix) than the technique we use below. We obtain
a T log(T
α
) result below in Theorem 2.
We propose a novel approach that decomposes H into a direct
sum of two functions spaces (defined below), each of which capture
the simpler functions w1xiT and ciT respectively. We provide a
general result about such decomposition which allows us to bound
C(,H, d¯l1). We start with the following definition.
DEFINITION 1. Direct-sum semi-free product of function
spaces G ⊂ ×iGi and ×iFi is defined as G ⊕ ×iFi = {〈g1 +
f1, . . . , gT−1 + fT−1〉 | 〈g1, . . . , gT−1〉 ∈ G, 〈f1, . . . , fT−1〉 ∈
×iFi}.
Applying the above definition for our case, Gi contains func-
tions of the form wxiT (w taking different values for differ-
ent gi ∈ Gi). A function 〈g1, . . . , gT−1〉 ∈ ×iGi can have
different weights for each component gi, and thus we con-
sider the subset G = {〈g1, . . . , gT−1〉 | 〈g1, . . . , gT−1〉 ∈
×iGi, same coefficient w for all gi}. Fi contains constant valued
functions of the form ciT (ciT different for different functions
fi ∈ Fi). Then, H = G ⊕ ×iFi. Next, we prove a general re-
sult about direct-sum semi-free products:
LEMMA 1. IfH is the direct-sum semi-free product G ⊕ ×iFi
C(,H, d¯l1) < C(/2,G, d¯l1)
T−1∏
i=1
C(/2,Fi, dl1)
PROOF. Fix any probability distribution over X , say P . For
brevity, we write k instead of T − 1. Consider an /2-cover
Ui for each Fi; also let V be an /2-cover for G. We claim
that V ⊕ ×iUi is an -cover for G ⊕ ×iFi. Take any func-
tion h = 〈g1 + f1, . . . gk + fk〉. Find functions f ′i ∈ Ui
such that dL1(P,dl1 )(fi, f
′
i) < /2. Similarly, find function
g′ = 〈g′1, . . . g′k〉 ∈ V such that dL1(P, ¯dl1 )(g, g
′) < /2 where
g = 〈g1, . . . gk〉. Let h′ = 〈g′1 + f ′1, . . . g′k + f ′k〉. Then,
dL1(P, ¯dl1 )
(h, h′)
=
∫
X
1
k
k∑
i=1
dl1(gi(x) + fi(x), g
′
i(x) + f
′
i(x)) dP (x)
≤
∫
X
1
k
k∑
i=1
dl1(gi(x), g
′
i(x)) + dl1(fi(x), f
′
i(x)) dP (x)
= dL1(P, ¯dl1 )
(g, g′) +
1
k
k∑
i=1
dL1(P,dl1 )
(fi, f
′
i)
< /2 + /2 = 
Thus, the size of -cover for G ⊕×iFi is bounded by |V |∏i |Ui|.
N (,G ⊕ ×iFi, dL1(P, ¯dl1 )) < |V |
∏
i |Ui|
= N (/2,G, dL1(P, ¯dl1 ))
∏k
i=1N (/2,Fi, dL1(P,dl1 ))
Taking sup over probability distribution P on both sides of the
above inequality we get our desired result about capacity.
Next, we need to bound the capacity of G andFi for our case. We
assume the range of all these functions (gi, fi) to be [−M4 , M4 ] (so
that their sum hi lies in [−M2 , M2 ]). We can obtain sharp bounds on
the capacities of G and Fi decomposed from H in order to obtain
sharp bounds on the overall capacity.
LEMMA 2. C(,G, d¯l1) ≤M/4 and C(,Fi, dl1) ≤M/4.
PROOF SKETCH. First, note that xiT = xi − xT lies between
[−1, 1] due to the constraints on xi, xT . Then, for any two func-
tions g, g′ ∈ G we can prove following result: dL1(P, ¯dl1 )(g, g
′) ≤
|(w − w′)| (details in Appendix). Also, note that since the range
of any g = w(xi − xT ) is [−M4 , M4 ] and given xi − xT lies be-
tween [−1, 1], we can claim that w lies between [−M
4
, M
4
]. Thus,
given the distance between functions is bounded by the difference
in weights, it enough to divide the M/2 range of the weights into
intervals of size 2 and consider functions at the boundaries. Hence
the -cover has at most M/4 functions.
The proof for constant valued functions Fi is similar, since its
straightforward to see the distance between two functions in this
space is the difference in the constant output. Also, the constants
lie in [−M
4
, M
4
], Then, the argument is same as the G case.
Then, plugging the result of Lemma 2 (substituting /2 for ) into
Lemma 1 we obtain C(,H, d¯l1) < (M/2)T . Having bounded
C(,H, d¯l1), we use Theorem 1 to obtain:
THEOREM 2. The generalized SUQR parametric hypothesis
classH is (α, δ)-PAC learnable with sample complexity4
O
(( 1
α2
)(
log(
1
δ
) + T log(
T
α
)
))
The above result shows a modest T log T growth of sample com-
plexity with increasing targets, suggesting the parametric approach
can avoid overfitting limited data with increasing number of targets;
however, the simplicity of the functions captured by this approach
(compared to NPL) results in lower accuracy with increasing data,
as shown later in our experiments on real-world data.
5.2 Non-Parametric Lipschitz case
Recall that H for the NPL case is defined such that each com-
ponent function hi is L-Lipschitz where L ≤ Kˆ. Consider the
functions spaces Hi consisting of real valued L-Lipschitz func-
tions where L ≤ Kˆ. Then, H = ×iHi. Then, using Equation 2:
C(,H, d¯l1) ≤
∏T−1
i=1 C(,Hi, dl1).
Next, our task is to bound C(,Hi, dl1). Consider the sup-
distance metric between real valued functions: dl∞(hi, h
′
i) =
supX |hi(x) − h′i(x)| for hi, h′i ∈ Hi. Note that dl∞ is in-
dependent of any probability distribution P , and for all func-
tions hi, h′i and any P , dL1(P,dl1 )(hi, h
′
i) ≤ dl∞(hi, h′i).
Thus, we can infer [13] that for all P , N (,Hi, dL1(P,dl1 )) ≤N (,Hi, dl∞) and then taking sup over P (recall C(,Hi, dl1) =
supP {N (,Hi, dL1(P,dl1 ))}) we get
C(,Hi, dl1) ≤ N (,Hi, dl∞) (3)
We bound N (,Hi, dl∞) in terms of covering number for X (re-
call X = {x | x ∈ [0, 1]T ,∑i xi ≤ K}) using results from [31].
LEMMA 3. N (,Hi, dl∞) ≤
(
2
⌈
M

⌉
+ 1
)
· 2N ( 2Kˆ ,X,dl∞ )
To use the above result, we still need to boundN (,X, dl∞). We
do so by combining two remarkable results about Eulerian number〈
T
k
〉
[16] (k has to be integral).
• Laplace [8] [28] discovered that the volume of Xk =
{x|x ∈ [0, 1]T , k − 1 ≤ ∑i xi ≤ k} is 〈Tk〉/T !. Thus,
if XK = ∪Kk=1Xk, then vol(XK) =
∑K
k=1 vol(Xk) =∑K
k=1
〈
T
k
〉
/T !.
• Also, it is known [30] that 〈T
k
〉
/T ! = FT (k) − FT (k − 1),
where FT (x) is the CDF of the probability distribution of
ST = U1 + . . . + UT and each Ui is a uniform random
variable on [0, 1).
Combining these results, vol(XK+1) = FT (K + 1). The volume
of a l∞ ball of radius  (l∞ ball is a hypercube) is (2)T [33].
Then, the number of balls that fit tightly (aligned with the axes)
and completely inside XK+1 is bounded by FT (K + 1)/(2)T .
Since  << 1, these balls cover XK = X completely and the tight
packing ensures that the center of the balls forms an -cover for
X . Then, bounding FT (K + 1) using Bernstein’s inequality about
concentration of random variables we get:
LEMMA 4. For K + 1 ≤ 0.5T (recall K << T )
N (,X, dl∞) ≤ e
−3T (0.5−(K+1)/T )2
1−(K+1)/T /(2)T
Plugging the above result into Lemma 3 and then using that in
Equation 3, we bound C(,Hi, dl1). Finally, Equation 2 gives a
bound on C(,H, d¯l1) that we use in Theorem 1 to obtain
4In the Appendix, we show that for standard SUQR (simpler than
our generalized SUQR) the sample size is O
(
1
α2
(log 1
δ
+ log T
α
)
)
THEOREM 3. The non-parametric hypothesis class H is a
(α, δ)-PAC learnable with sample complexity
O
(( 1
α2
)(
log(
1
δ
) + (
TT+1
αT
)
))
The above result shows that the sample complexity for NPL grows
fast with T suggesting that NPL may not be the right approach to
use when the number of targets is large.
6. LEARNING ALGORITHM
As stated earlier, our loss function was designed so that the learn-
ing algorithm (empirical risk minimizer in PAC framework) was
same as maximizing log likelihood of data. Indeed, for SUQR,
the standard MLE approach can be used to learn the parameters
(weights) and has been used in literature [25]. However, for NPL,
which has no parameters, maximizing likelihood only provides
h(x) for those mixed strategies x that are in the training data.
Hence we present a novel two step learning algorithm for the
NPL case. In the first step, we estimate the most likely value for
hi(x) (for each i) for each x in the training data, ensuring that for
any pair x, x′ in the training data, |hi(x) − hi(x′)| ≤ Kˆ||x −
x′||1. In the second step, we construct the function hi with the
least Lipschitz constant subject to the constraint that hi takes the
values for the training data output by the first step.
More formally, assume the training data has s unique values for
x in the training set and let these values be x1, . . . , xs. Further, let
there be nj distinct data points against xj , i.e., nj attacks against
mixed strategy xj . Denote by nj,i the number of attacks at each
target i when xj was used. Let hij be the variable that stands for
the estimate of value hi(xj); i ∈ {1, . . . , T}, j ∈ {1, . . . , s}. Fix
hTj = 0 for all j. Then, probability of attack on target i against
mixed strategy xj is given by qij = e
hij∑
i e
hij
. Thus, the log likeli-
hood of the training data is
∑s
j=1
∑T
i=1 nj,i log qij . Let Lip(Kˆ)
denote the set of L-Lipschitz functions with L ≤ Kˆ. Using our
assumption that hi ∈ Lip(Kˆ), the following optimization problem
provides the most likely hij :
max
hij
s∑
j=1
T∑
i=1
nj,i log
ehij∑
i e
hij
subject to ∀i, j, j′, |hij − hij′ | ≤ Kˆ||xj − xj
′ ||1
∀i, j, −M/2 ≤ hij ≤M/2
Given solution h∗ij to the above problem, we wish to construct
the solution hi such that its Lipschitz constant (given by Khi ) is
the lowest possible subject to hi taking the value h∗ij for x
j . Such
a construction provides the most smoothly varying solution given
the training data, i.e., we do not assume any more sharp changes in
the adversary response than what the training data provides.
min
hi∈Lip(Kˆ)
Khi subject to ∀i, j. hi(xj) = h∗ij (MinLip)
The above optimization is impractical to solve computationally as
uncountably many constraints are required to relateKhi to hi, For-
tunately, we obtain an analytical solution:
LEMMA 5. The following is a solution for problem MinLip
hi(x) = minj{h∗ij +K∗i ||x− xj ||1}
where K∗i = maxj,j′:j 6=j′
|h∗ij−h∗ij′ |
||xj−xj′ ||1
PROOF SKETCH. Observe that due to the definition of K∗ any
solution toMinLipwill have Lipschitz constant≥ K∗. Thus, it suf-
fices to show that the Lipschitz constant of hi is K∗, to prove that
hi is a solution of MinLip, which we show in the Appendix.
Note that for any point xj is the training data we have hi(xj) =
h∗ij . Then the value of hi(x) for a x not in the training set and close
to xj is quite likely be the hi(xj) plus the scaled distance K∗i ||x−
xj ||1 showing the value of x is influenced by nearby training points.
7. UTILITY BOUNDS
Next, we bound the difference between the optimal utility and
the utility derived from planning using the learned h. The util-
ity bound is same for the parametric and NPL case. Recall that
the defender receives the utility xUqp(x) when playing strategy
x. We need to bound the difference between the true distribu-
tion qp(x) and the predicted distribution qh(x) of attacks in or-
der to start analyzing bounds on utility. Thus, we transform the
PAC learning guarantee about the risk of output h to a bound on
||qp(x)− qh(x)||1. As the PAC guarantee only bounds the risk be-
tween predicted h and the best hypothesis h∗ inH, in order to relate
the true distribution qp and predicted distribution qh, the lemma be-
low assumes a bounded KL divergence between the distribution of
the best hypothesis qh
∗
and the true distribution qp.
LEMMA 6. Assume E[KL(qp(x) || qh∗(x))] ≤ ∗. Given
an ERM A with output h = A(~z) and guarantee Pr(|rh(p) −
rh∗(p)| < α) > 1 − δ, with prob. ≥ 1 − δ over training samples
~z we have
Pr(||qp(x)− qh(x)||1 ≤
√
2∆) ≥ 1−∆
where ∆ = (α+ ∗)1/3 and x is sampled using density p.
Utility bound: Next, we provide an utility bound, given the
above guarantee about learned h. Let the optimal strategy com-
puted using the learned adversary model h be x˜, i.e., x˜TUqh(x˜) ≥
x′TUqh(x′) for all x′. Let the true optimal defender mixed strat-
egy be x∗ (optimal w.r.t. true attack distribution qp(x)), so that the
maximum defender utility is x∗TUqp(x∗). Let B(x, ) denote the
l1 ball of radius  around x. We make the following assumptions:
1. hi is Kˆ-Lipschitz ∀i and qp is K-Lipschitz in l1 norm.
2. ∃ small  such that Pr(x ∈ B(x∗, )) > ∆ over choice of x
using p.
3. ∃ small  such that Pr(x ∈ B(x˜, )) > ∆ over choice of x
using p.
While the first assumption is mild 5, the last two assumptions for
small  mean that the points x∗ and x˜ must not lie in low density
regions of the distribution p used to sample the data points. In other
words, there should be many defender mixed strategies in the data
of defender-adversary interaction that lie near x∗ and x˜. We discuss
the assumptions in details after the technical results below. Given
these assumptions, we need Lemma 7 that relates assumption (1) to
Lipschitzness of qh in order to obtain the utility bound.
LEMMA 7. If hi is Kˆ-Lipschitz then ∀x, x′ ∈ X. ||qh(x) −
qh(x′)||1 ≤ 3Kˆ||x− x′||1, i.e., qh(x) is 3Kˆ-Lipschitz.
Then, we can prove the following:
THEOREM 4. Given above assumptions and the results of
Lemma 6 and 7, with prob. ≥ 1 − δ over the training samples
the expected utility x˜TUqh(x˜) for the learned h is at least
x∗TUqp(x∗)− (K + 1)− 2
√
2∆− 6Kˆ
5Lipschitzness is a mild restriction on function classes.
Discussion of assumptions: A puzzling phenomenon observed
in recent work on learning in SSGs is that good prediction accu-
racy of the learned adversary behavior is not a reliable indicator
of the defender’s performance in practice [10]. The additional as-
sumptions, over and above the PAC learning guarantee, are made
to bound the utility deviation from the optimal utility point towards
the possibility of such occurrences. Recall that the second assump-
tion requires the existence of many defender mixed strategies in
the dataset near the utility optimal strategy x∗. Of course x∗ is not
known apriori, hence in order to guarantee utility close to the high-
est possible utility the dataset must contain defender mixed strate-
gies from all regions of the mixed strategy space; or at-least if it
is known that some regions of the mixed strategies dominate other
parts in terms of utility then it is enough to have mixed strategies
from these regions. Thus, following our assumption, better utility
can be achieved by collecting attack data against a variety of mixed
strategies rather than many attacks against few mixed strategies.
Going further, we illustrate with a somewhat extreme example
where violating our assumptions can lead to this undesirable phe-
nomenon. For the purpose of illustration, consider the extreme ex-
ample where probability distribution p (recall data points are sam-
pled using p) puts all probability mass on x0, where the the util-
ity for x0 is much lower than x∗. Hence, the dataset will contain
only one defender mixed strategy x0 (with many attacks against it).
Due to Lipschitzness (assumption 1), the large utility difference
between x0 and x∗ implies that x0 is not close to x∗ which in turn
violates assumption 2. This example provides a very good PAC
guarantee since there is no requirement for the learning algorithm
to predict accurately for any other mixed strategies (which occur
with zero probability) in order to have good prediction accuracy.
The learning technique needs to predict well only for x0 to achieve
a low α, δ. As a result the defender strategy computed against the
learned adversary model may not be utility maximizing because of
the poor predictions for all defender mixed strategies other than the
low utility yielding x0. More generally, good prediction accuracy
can be achieved by good predictions only for the mixed strategies
that occur with high probability.
Indeed, in general, the prediction accuracy in the PAC model
(and any applied machine learning approach) is not a reliable in-
dicator of good prediction over the entire space of defender mixed
strategies unless, following our assumption 2, the dataset has at-
tacks against strategies from all parts of the mixed strategy space.
However, in past work [1, 7] researchers have focused on gathering
a lot of attack data but on limited number of defender strategies.
We believe that our analysis, in addition to providing a principled
explanation of prior observations, provides guidance towards meth-
ods of discovering the defender’s utility maximizing strategy.
8. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We show experimental results on two datasets: (i) real-world
poaching data from QENP (obtained from [24]); (ii) data from hu-
man subjects experiments on AMT (obtained from [14]), to esti-
mate prediction errors and the amount of data required to reduce
the error for both the parametric and NPL learning settings. Also,
we compare the NPL approach with both the standard as well
as the generalized SUQR approach and show that: (i) the NPL
approach, while computationally slow, outperforms the standard
SUQR model for Uganda data; and (ii) the performance of gen-
eralized SUQR is in between NPL and standard SUQR.
For each dataset, we conduct four experiments with 25%, 50%,
75% and 100% of the original data. We create 100 train-test splits
in each of the four experiments per dataset. For each train-test split
we compute the average prediction error α (average difference be-
(a) SUQR, Uganda data,
coarse-grained prediction
(b) NPL, Uganda data,
coarse-grained prediction
(c) SUQR, Uganda data,
fine-grained prediction
(d) NPL, Uganda data,
fine-grained prediction
(e) Generalized SUQR,
Uganda Data, fine-grained
prediction
(f) Generalized SUQR, Uganda
Data, coarse-grained
prediction
(g) Parametric, AMT data (h) NPL, AMT data
Figure 1: Results on Uganda and AMT datasets for both the
parametric and NPL learning settings.
tween the log-likelihoods of the attacks in the test data using pre-
dicted and actual attack probabilities). We report the α value at the
1 − δ percentile of the 100 α values, e.g., reported α = 2.09 for
δ = 0.1 means that 90 of the 100 test splits have α < 2.09.
8.1 Real-World Poaching data
We first present results of our experiments with real-world
poaching data. The dataset obtained contained information about
features such as ranger patrols and animal densities, which are used
as features in our SUQR model, and the poachers’ attacks, with
40,611 total observations recorded by rangers at various locations
in the park. The park area was discretized into 2423 grid cells, with
each grid cell corresponding to a 1km2 area within the park. After
discretization, each observation fell within one of 2423 target cells
and the animal densities and the number of poaching attacks within
each target cell were then aggregated. The dataset contained 655
poachers’ attacks in response to the defender’s strategy for 2012 at
QENP. Although the data is reliable because the rangers recorded
the latitudes and longitudes of the location for each observation
using a GPS device, it is important to note that this data set is ex-
tremely noisy because of: (i) Missing observations: all the poach-
ing events are not recorded because the limited number of rangers
cannot patrol all the areas in this park all the time; (ii) Uncertain
feature values: the animal density feature is also based on incom-
plete observations of animals; (iii) Uncertain defender strategy: the
actual defender mixed strategy is unknown, and hence, we estimate
the mixed strategies based on the provided patrol data.
In this paper, we provide two types of prediction in our exper-
iments: (i) fine-grained and (ii) coarse-grained. First, to provide
a baseline for our error measures, we use the same coarse-grained
prediction approach as reported by Nguyen et al. [24], in which the
authors only predict whether a target will be attacked or not. The
results for coarse-grained predictions with our performance metric
(α values for different δ) are shown in Figs. 1(a), 1(b) and 1(f).
Next, in the fine-grained prediction approach we predict the actual
number of attacks on each target in our test set; these results are
shown in Figs. 1(c), 1(d) and 1(e). In [24], the authors used a par-
ticular metric for prediction performance called the area under the
ROC curve (AUC), which we will discuss later in the section.
From our fine-grained and coarse-grained prediction approaches,
we make several important observations. First, we observe that α
decreases with increasing sample size at a rate proportional to 1√
m
,
where m is the number of samples. For example, in Fig. 1(a), the
α values corresponding to δ = 0.01 (black bar) for the 25%, 50%,
75% and 100% data are 2.81, 2.38, 2.18 and 1.8 respectively, which
fits 1√
m
with a goodness-of-fit, i.e., r2=0.97. This observation sup-
ports the relationship between α and m shown in Theorem 3 and
can be used to approximately infer the number of samples required
to reduce the prediction error to a certain value. For example, as-
suming we collect same number of samples (=655) per year, to re-
duce α from 1.8 to 1.64, we would require two more years of data.
Note here that α is in log-scale and hence the decrease is signifi-
cant. It is also worth noting here that, for a random classifier, we
observe a value of α = 6.3 for δ = 0.01 while performing coarse
grained predictions with 25% data. This is more than α = 2.81 for
δ = 0.01 obtained for our standardized SUQR model while per-
forming coarse grained predictions with 25% data. As α is in the
log-scale, the increase in error is actually more than two-fold.
Our second observation is that α values for fine-grained predic-
tions (e.g., 2.9 for δ = 0.01 and 100% data for the standardized
SUQR model in Fig. 1(c)) are understandably higher than the cor-
responding values for coarse-grained predictions (1.8 for δ = 0.01
and 100% data for SUQR in Fig. 1(a)) because in the fine-grained
case we predict the exact number of attacks.
Third, we observe that the performance of the generalized SUQR
model (e.g., 2.47 for δ = 0.01 and 100% data in Fig. 1(e)) is better
in most cases than that of the standardized SUQR approach (2.9 for
δ = 0.01 and 100% data in Fig. 1(c)), but worse than the NPL
approach (2.15 for δ = 0.01 and 100% data in Fig. 1(d)).
Finally, we observe that our NPL model performs better than its
parametric counterparts in predicting future poaching attacks for
the fine-grained case (see example in previous paragraph), indicat-
ing that the true adversary behavior model may indeed be more
complicated than what can be captured by SUQR.
Relation to previous work: In earlier work, Nguyen et al. [24]
uses the area under curve (of a ROC curve) metric to demonstrate
the performance of their approaches. The AUC value of 0.73 re-
ported in their paper is an alternate view of our α, δ metric for the
coarse grained prediction approach. While there has been alter-
nate analysis in terms of measuring prediction performances with
the AUC metric in earlier papers, in our paper we have shown
new trends and insights with the α, δ metric through analysis from
the PAC model perspective, which is missing in earlier work. We
show: (i) sample complexity results and the relationship between
increasing number of samples and the reduction in prediction error
for each of our models; (ii) the differences in errors while learn-
ing a vector valued response function (fine-grained prediction) as
opposed to classifying targets as attacked or not (coarse-grained
prediction); and (iii) comparison of the performance of our new
NPL model with other parametric approaches in terms of both
Uganda Para-
metric
Uganda
NPL
AMT Para-
metric
AMT NPL
0.7188 121.24 0.91 123.4
Table 2: Runtime results (in secs.) for one train-test split
fine-grained and coarse-grained predictions and its effectiveness on
real-world poaching data which was not shown in previous work.
8.2 AMT data
Here we show fine-grained prediction results on real-world AMT
data obtained from [14] to demonstrate the performance of both our
approaches on somewhat cleaner data. This dataset is cleaner than
the Uganda data because: (i) all attacks are observed, and (ii) an-
imal densities and deployed defender strategies are known. The
dataset consisted of 16 unique mixed strategies. There were an
average of 40 attack data points per mixed strategy. Each attack
had been conducted by an unique individual recruited on AMT.
We used attack data corresponding to 11 randomly chosen mixed
strategies for training and data for the remaining mixed strategies
for testing. Results are shown in Figs. 1(g) and 1(h). We observe
that: (i) α values in this case are lower as compared to the Uganda
data as the AMT data is cleaner; and (ii) the NPL model’s perfor-
mance on this dataset is poor as compared to SUQR due to, (a)
low number of samples in AMT data, and (b) real-world poacher
behavior may be more complicated than that of AMT participants
and hence SUQR in this case was able to better capture AMT par-
ticipants’ behavior with limited number of samples.6
Runtime: While running on Matlab R2015a on an Intel Core
i7-5500 CPU@2.40Ghz, 8GB RAM machine with a 64-bit Win-
dows 10, on average, the NPL computation takes longer than the
parametric setting, as shown in Table 2.
9. CONCLUSION
Over the last couple of years, a lot of work has used learning
methods to learn bounded rationality adversary behavioral model,
but there has been no formal study of the learning process and its
implication on the defender’s performance. The lack of formal
analysis also means that many practical questions go unanswered.
We have advanced the state of the art in learning of adversary be-
haviors in SSGs, in terms of their analysis and implications of such
learned behaviors on defender’s performance.
While we used the PAC framework, it is not an out of the box
approach. We needed to come up with innovative techniques to ob-
tain sharp bounds for our case. Furthermore, we also provide a new
non-parametric learning approach which showed promising results
with real-world data. Finally, we provided a principled explanation
of observed phenomenon that prediction accuracy is not enough to
guarantee good defender performance. We explained why datasets
with attacks against a variety of defender mixed strategies helps in
achieving good defender performance. Finally, we hope this work
leads to more theoretical work in learning of adversary models and
the use of non-parametric models in the real world.
6In the Appendix we show that, on simulated data, α does indeed
approach zero and NPL outperforms SUQR with enough samples.
REFERENCES
[1] Y. D. Abbasi, M. Short, A. Sinha, N. Sintov, C. Zhang, and
M. Tambe. Human adversaries in opportunistic crime
security games: Evaluating competing bounded rationality
models. In Conference on Advances in Cognitive Systems,
2015.
[2] M. Anthony and P. L. Bartlett. Neural Network Learning:
Theoretical Foundations. Cambridge University Press, New
York, NY, USA, 1st edition, 2009.
[3] M.-F. Balcan, A. Blum, N. Haghtalab, and A. D. Procaccia.
Commitment without regrets: Online learning in stackelberg
security games. In Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM
Conference on Economics and Computation, EC ’15, 2015.
[4] M.-F. Balcan, A. D. Procaccia, and Y. Zick. Learning
cooperative games. In Proceedings of the International Joint
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI ’15, 2015.
[5] N. Basilico, N. Gatti, and F. Amigoni. Leader-follower
strategies for robotic patrolling in environments with
arbitrary topologies. In Proceedings of The 8th International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems-Volume 1, pages 57–64. International Foundation for
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2009.
[6] A. Blum, N. Haghtalab, and A. D. Procaccia. Learning
optimal commitment to overcome insecurity. In Advances in
Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 1826–1834,
2014.
[7] J. Cui and R. S. John. Empirical comparisons of descriptive
multi-objective adversary models in stackelberg security
games. In Decision and Game Theory for Security, pages
309–318. Springer, 2014.
[8] M. de Laplace. Oeuvres complètes. Oeuvres complètes,
7:257, 1886.
[9] F. Fang, T. H. Nguyen, B. An, M. Tambe, R. Pickles, W. Y.
Lam, and G. R. Clements. Towards addressing challenges in
green security games in the wild (extended abstract). In
Workshop of Behavioral, Economic and Computational
Intelligence for Security (BECIS) held at IJCAI, 2015.
[10] B. Ford, T. Nguyen, M. Tambe, N. Sintov, and F. D. Fave.
Beware the soothsayer: From attack prediction accuracy to
predictive reliability in security games. In Conference on
Decision and Game Theory for Security, 2015.
[11] J. Gan, B. An, and Y. Vorobeychik. Security games with
protection externalities. In Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference
on Artificial Intelligence, 2015.
[12] W. Haskell, D. Kar, F. Fang, M. Tambe, S. Cheung, and L. E.
Denicola. Robust protection of fisheries with compass. In
Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence (IAAI),
2014.
[13] D. Haussler. Decision theoretic generalizations of the pac
model for neural net and other learning applications. Inf.
Comput., 100(1):78–150, Sept. 1992.
[14] D. Kar, F. Fang, F. D. Fave, N. Sintov, and M. Tambe. A
Game of Thrones: When human behavior models compete in
repeated stackelberg security games. In International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(AAMAS), 2015.
[15] M. J. Kearns and U. V. Vazirani. An introduction to
computational learning theory. MIT press, 1994.
[16] D. E. Knuth. The art of computer programming: sorting and
searching, volume 3. Pearson Education, 1998.
[17] D. Korzhyk, V. Conitzer, and R. Parr. Complexity of
computing optimal stackelberg strategies in security resource
allocation games. In In Proceedings of the National
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 805–810,
2010.
[18] S. Kullback. Information Theory and Statistics. John Wiley
and Sons, 1959.
[19] J. Letchford, V. Conitzer, and K. Munagala. Learning and
approximating the optimal strategy to commit to. In
Algorithmic Game Theory, pages 250–262. Springer, 2009.
[20] U. v. Luxburg and O. Bousquet. Distance–based
classification with lipschitz functions. The Journal of
Machine Learning Research, 5:669–695, 2004.
[21] J. Marecki, G. Tesauro, and R. Segal. Playing repeated
stackelberg games with unknown opponents. In Proceedings
of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents
and Multiagent Systems-Volume 2, pages 821–828, 2012.
[22] D. McFadden. Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice
behavior. Frontiers in Econometrics, pages 105–142, 1973.
[23] D. McFadden. Quantal choice analysis: A survey. Annals of
Economic and Social Measurement, 5(4):363–390, 1976.
[24] T. H. Nguyen, F. M. D. Fave, D. Kar, A. S.
Lakshminarayanan, A. Yadav, M. Tambe, N. Agmon, A. J.
Plumptre, M. Driciru, F. Wanyama, and A. Rwetsiba.
Making the most of our regrets: Regret-based solutions to
handle payoff uncertainty and elicitation in green security
games. In Conference on Decision and Game Theory for
Security, 2015.
[25] T. H. Nguyen, R. Yang, A. Azaria, S. Kraus, and M. Tambe.
Analyzing the effectiveness of adversary modeling in
security games. In Conf. on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI),
2013.
[26] P. Paruchuri, J. P. Pearce, J. Marecki, M. Tambe, F. Ordonez,
and S. Kraus. Playing games for security: An efficient exact
algorithm for solving bayesian stackelberg games. In
Proceedings of the 7th International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2,
AAMAS, pages 895–902, 2008.
[27] D. Pollard. Convergence of stochastic processes. David
Pollard, 1984.
[28] R. Stanley. Eulerian partitions of a unit hypercube. Higher
Combinatorics (M. Aigner, ed.), Reidel, Dordrecht/Boston,
49, 1977.
[29] M. Tambe. Security and Game Theory: Algorithms,
Deployed Systems, Lessons Learned. Cambridge University
Press, New York, NY, USA, 1st edition, 2011.
[30] S. Tanny. A probabilistic interpretation of eulerian numbers.
Duke Mathematical Journal, 40(4):717–722, 1973.
[31] V. Tikhomirov and A. Kolmogorov. ε-entropy and ε-capacity
of sets in functional spaces. In Selected Works of AN
Kolmogorov, pages 86–170. Springer, 1993.
[32] Y. Vorobeychik and B. Li. Optimal randomized classification
in adversarial settings. In Proceedings of the 2014
international conference on Autonomous agents and
multi-agent systems, pages 485–492. International
Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems, 2014.
[33] X. Wang. Volumes of generalized unit balls. Mathematics
Magazine, pages 390–395, 2005.
[34] R. Yang, B. Ford, M. Tambe, and A. Lemieux. Adaptive
resource allocation for wildlife protection against illegal
poachers. In Proceedings of the 2014 International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems,
AAMAS ’14, 2014.
[35] C. Zhang, A. Sinha, and M. Tambe. Keeping pace with
criminals: Designing patrol allocation against adaptive
opportunistic criminals. In International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2015),
2015.
APPENDIX
The Appendix is structured as follows: Section A contains the
missing proofs, Section B contains the result of the applicability
of our techniques for Stackelberg games, Section C constains re-
sults about the sample complexity of standard SUQR, Section D
contains the weaker sample complexity bound result for the gen-
eralized SUQR model derived using the approach of Haussler and
Section E contains additional experiments.
A. PROOFS
Proof of Theorem 1
PROOF. First, Haussler uses the following pseudo metric ρ on
A that is defined using the loss function l:
ρ(a, b) = maxy∈Y |l(y, a)− l(y, b)|.
To start with, relying on Haussler’s result, we show
Pr(∀h ∈ H.|rˆh(~z)−rh(p)| < α
3
) ≥ 1−4C
( α
48
,H, ρ
)
e
− α2m
576M2
Choose α = α′/4M and ν = 2M in Theorem 9 of [13]. Us-
ing property (3) (Section 2.2, [13]) of dv we obtain |r − s| ≤ 
whenever dv(r, s) ≤ α′. Using this directly in Theorem 9 of Haus-
sler [13] we obtain the desired result above.
Note the dependence of the above probability on m (the number
of samples), and compare it to the first pre-condition in the PAC
learning result. By equating δ/2 to 4C(α/48,H, ρ)e− α
2m
576M2 , we
derive the sample complexity as
m ≥ 576M
2
α2
log
8C(α/48,H, ρ)
δ
We wish to compute a bound on C(,H, ρ) in order to use the
above result to obtain sample complexity. First, we prove that
ρ ≤ 2Tdl¯1 for the loss function we use. This result is used to
bound C(,H, ρ), since, it is readily verified from definition that
C(,H, ρ) ≤ C(/2T,H, dl¯1). Such a bounding directly gives
m ≥ 576M
2
α2
log
8C(α/96T,H, ρ)
δ
Below we prove that ρ ≤ 2Tdl¯1 .
LEMMA 8. Given the loss function defined above, we have
ρ(a, b) ≤ 2 maxi |ai − bi| ≤ 2∑i |ai − bi| ≤ 2Tdl¯1(a, b)
PROOF. By definition, ρ(a, b) = maxi
∣∣∣ − ai + bi +
log
1+
∑T−1
i=1 e
ai
1+
∑T−1
i=1 e
bi
∣∣∣ ≤ maxi |ai − bi| + ∣∣ log 1+∑T−1i=1 eai
1+
∑T−1
i=1 e
bi
∣∣∣. There
is j and k such that maxr = e
aj
e
bj
≥ eai
ebi
for all i and minr =
eak
ebk
≤ eai
ebi
for all i. Thus,
log
1 +minrt
1 + t
≤ log 1 +
∑T−1
i=1 e
ai
1 +
∑T−1
i=1 e
bi
≤ log 1 +maxrt
1 + t
where t =
∑T−1
i=1 e
bi . The greatest positive value of the RHS is
logmaxr ≤ |aj − bj | and least negative value possible for LHS is
logminr ≥ −|ak − bk|. Thus,∣∣ log 1 +∑T−1i=1 eai
1 +
∑T−1
i=1 e
bi
∣∣ ≤ max
i
∣∣ai − bi∣∣
Hence, we obtain ρ(a, b) = maxi |l(yi, a) − l(yi, b)| ≤
2 maxi |ai − bi|, and the last inequality is trivial.
Thus, using the above result we get
m ≥ 576M
2
α2
log
8C(α/96T,H, dl¯1)
δ
Proof of Lemma 2
PROOF. First, note that xiT = xi−xT lies between [−1, 1] due
to the constraints on xi, xT . Then, for any two functions g, g′ ∈ G
we have the following result:
dL1(P, ¯dl1 )
(g, g′) =
=
∫
X
1
T − 1
T−1∑
i=1
dl1(w(xi − xT ), w′(xi − xT )) dP (x)
=
∫
X
1
T − 1
T−1∑
i=1
|(w − w′)(xi − xT )| dP (x)
≤
∫
X
1
T − 1
T−1∑
i=1
|(w − w′)| dP (x) = |(w − w′)|
Also, note that since the range of any g = w(xi−xT ) is [−M4 , M4 ]
and given xi − xT lies between [−1, 1], we can claim that w lies
between [−M
4
, M
4
]. Thus, given the distance between functions is
bounded by the difference in weights, it enough to divide the M/2
range of the weights into intervals of size 2 and consider functions
at the boundaries. Hence the -cover has at most M/4 functions.
The proof for constant valued functions Fi is similar, since its
straightforward to see the distance between two functions in this
space is the difference in the constant output. Also, the constants
lie in [−M
4
, M
4
], Then, the argument is same as the G case.
Proof of Lemma 3
PROOF. First, the space of functions Hˆ = {h/Kˆ | h ∈ Hi}
is Lipschitz with Lipschitz constant ≤ 1 and |hi(x)| ≤ M/2Kˆ.
Clearly N (,Hi, dl∞) ≤ N (/Kˆ, Hˆ, dl∞). Using the following
result from [31]: for any Lipschitz real valued function space H
with constant 1, any positive integer s and any distance d
N (,H, dl∞) ≤
(
2
⌈M(s+ 1)
2Kˆ
⌉
+ 1
)
· (s+ 1)N ( ss+1 ,X,d)
Then, we get the bound on N (/Kˆ, Hˆ, dl∞) by choosing s =
1 and d = dl∞ , and hence obtain the desired bound on
N (,Hi, dl∞).
Proof of Lemma 4
PROOF. For ease of notation, we do the proof with k standing
for K + 1. Let Yi = Ui − 0.5, then |Y | ≤ 1/2 and ST − 0.5T =∑
i Yi. Using Bernstein’s inequality with the fact that E[Y
2
i ] =
1/12
P (
∑
i
Yi = ST − 0.5T ≤ −t) ≤ e
−0.5t2
T/12+t/6
Thus, P (ST ≤ 0.5T − t) ≤ e
0.5t2
T/12+t/6 . Take k = 0.5T − t, and
hence t = 0.5T − k = T (0.5− k/T ). Hence,
P (ST ≤ k) ≤ e
−3T (0.5−k/T )2
1−k/T
Proof of Theorem 3
PROOF. Given the results of Lemma 3, we get the sample com-
plexity is of order
1
α2
(
log
1
δ
+ T
(N (α
T
,X, dl1)
))
Now, suing result of Lemma 4, we get the required order in the The-
orem. We wish to note that if K/T is a constant then the O(e−T )
in Lemma 4 gets swamped by the TT term. However, in practice
for fixed T , this term does provide lower actual complexity bound
than what is indicated by the order.
Proof of Lemma 5
PROOF. Observe that due to the definition of K∗ any solution
to MinLip will have Lipschitz constant ≥ K∗. Thus, it suffices to
show that the Lipschitz constant of hi is K∗, to prove that hi is a
solution of MinLip. Take any two x, x′. If the min in the expression
for hi occurs for the same j for both x, x′ then |hi(x)− hi(x′)| is
given by K∗|||x− xj ||1 − ||x′ − xj ||1|. By application of triangle
inequality
−||x− x′||1 ≤ ||x− xj ||1 − ||x′ − xj ||1 ≤ ||x− x′||1
Thus, |hi(x)− hi(x′)| ≤ K∗||x− x′||1.
For the other case when the min for x occurs at some j and min
for x′ at some j′ we have the following: hi(x′) = hij′ +K∗||x′−
xj
′ ||1 and hi(x) = hij + K∗||x − xj′ ||1 . Also, due to the min,
hi(x
′) ≤ hij + K∗||x′ − xj ||1 = hi(x) + K∗||x′ − xj ||1 −
K∗||x− xj′ ||1. Thus, we get
hi(x
′)−hi(x) ≤ K∗(||x′−xj ||1−||x−xj ||1) ≤ K∗||x′−x||1
Using the symmetric case inequality for x we get
hi(x)−hi(x′) ≤ K∗(||x−xj ||1−||x′−xj ||1) ≤ K∗||x−x′||1
Combining both these we can claim that |hi(x) − hi(x′)| ≤
K∗||x′ − x||1. Thus, we have proved that hi is K∗ Lipschitz,
and hence a solution of MinLip.
Proof of Lemma 6
PROOF. Let pX be the marginal of p(x, y)
for space X . Define the expected entropy
E[H(x)] =
∫
pX(x)
∑T
i=1 Iy=tiq
p
i (x) log q
p
i (x) dx.
Given the loss function, we know that rh(p) =
− ∫ p(x, y)∑Ti=1 Iy=ti log qhi (x) dx dy. This is same as
− ∫ pX(x)∑Ti=1 Iy=tiqpi (x)∑Ti=1 Iy=ti log qhi (x) dx dy. This
reduces to − ∫ pX(x)∑Ti=1 Iy=tiqpi (x) log qhi (x) dx dy. Thus,
we have
E[H(x)] + rh(p) =
∫
pX(x)
T∑
i=1
Iy=tiq
p
i (x) log
qpi (x)
qhi (x)
dx dy
Hence, we obtain
E[H(x)] + rh(p) = E[KL(qp(x) || qh(x))]
Hence, |rh(p)− rh∗(p)| is equal to
|E[KL(qp(x) || qh(x))]− E[KL(qp(x) || q∗(x))]|
Thus, from the assumptions, we get E[KL(qp(x) || qh(x))] ≤ α+
∗ with probability ≥ 1 − δ. Next, using Markov inequality, with
probability ≥ 1− δ
Pr(KL(qp(x) || qh(x)) ≥ (α+ ∗)2/3) ≤ (α+ ∗)1/3
that is using the notation ∆ = (α+∗)1/3, with probability≥ 1−δ
Pr(KL(qp(x) || qh(x)) ≤ ∆2/3) ≥ 1−∆1/3
Using Pinkser’s inequality we get (1/2)||qp(x) − qh(x)||21 ≤
KL(qp(x)||qh(x)). That is, the event KL(qp(x) || qh(x)) ≤ ∆2/3
implies the event ||qp(x)− qh(x)||1 ≤
√
2∆. Thus, Pr(||qp(x)−
qh(x)||1 ≤
√
2∆) ≥ Pr(KL(qp(x) || qh(x)) ≤ ∆2/3). Thus,
we obtain: with probability ≥ 1 − δ, Pr(||qp(x) − qh(x)||1 ≤√
2∆) ≥ 1−∆.
Proof of Lemma 7
PROOF. We know that qhi (x) = e
hi(x)∑
j e
hj(x)
(assume hT (x) =
0). Thus,
|qhi (x)− qhi (x′)| = qhi (x′)|ehi(x)−hi(x
′)
∑
j e
hj(x
′)∑
j e
hj(x)
− 1|
Let r denote
∑
j e
hj(x
′)∑
j e
hj(x)
. There is l and k such that maxr =
ehl(x
′)
ehl(x)
≥ ehj(x
′)
e
hj(x)
for all j and minr = e
hk(x
′)
ehk(x)
≤ ehj(x
′)
e
hj(x)
for all
j. Then, minr ≤ r ≤ maxr First, note that due to our assumption
that for each i |hi(x′)− hi(x)| ≤ Kˆ||x′ − x||1, we have
e−Kˆ||x
′−x||1 ≤ minr ≤ r ≤ maxr ≤ eKˆ||x
′−x||1
Using the Lipschitzness we can also claim that e−Kˆ||x
′−x||1 ≤
ehi(x)−hi(x
′) ≤ eKˆ||x′−x||1 . Thus,
e−2Kˆ||x
′−x||1 ≤ ehi(x)−hi(x′) · r ≤ e2Kˆ||x′−x||1
Since, e−2Kˆ||x
′−x||1 < 1 and e2Kˆ||x
′−x||1 > 1 we have
|ehi(x)−hi(x′)r−1| ≤ max(|e−2Kˆ||x′−x||1−1|, |e2Kˆ||x′−x||1−1|)
Also, it is a fact that |ey − 1| ≤ 1.5|y| for |y| ≤ 3/4. Thus, we
obtain
|ehi(x)−hi(x′)r − 1| ≤ 3Kˆ||x′ − x||1 for 2Kˆ||x′ − x||1 ≤ 3/4
Thus, ||qh(x′) − qh(x)||1 = ∑i |qhi (x) − qhi (x′)| =∑
i q
h
i (x
′)|ehi(x)−hi(x′)
∑
j e
hj(x
′)∑
j e
hj(x)
− 1| ≤ (∑i qhi (x′))3Kˆ||x′ −
x||1 for Kˆ||x′ − x||1 ≤ 3/8. Since∑i qhi (x′) = 1, we have
||qh(x′)− qh(x)||1 ≤ 3Kˆ||x′ − x||1 for ||x′ − x||1 ≤ 3/8Kˆ
In other words qh is locally 3Kˆ-Lipschitz for every l1 norm ball
of size 3/8Kˆ. The following allows us to prove global Lipschitz-
ness.
LEMMA 9. Any locally L-Lipschitz function f for every lp ball
of size δ0 on a compact convex set X ⊂ Rn is Lipschitz on the set
X . The Lipschitz constant is also L.
PROOF. Take any two points x, y ∈ X , the straight line joining
x, y lies in X (as X is convex). Also, a finite number of balls
of size δ0 cover X (due to compactness). Thus, there are finitely
many points x = z1, . . . , zµ = y on the line from x, y such that
dlp(zi, zi+1) ≤ δ0. Further, since these points lie on a straight line
we have
dlp(x, y) =
∑µ−1
1 dlp(zi, zi+1)
Then, let any metric d be used to measure distance in the range
space of f , thus, we get
d(f(x), f(y)) ≤∑µ−11 d(f(zi), f(zi+1))
≤∑µ−11 Ldlp(zi, zi+1)
= Ldlp(x, y)
Since in our case the defender mixed strategy space is compact and
convex and qh(x) satisfies the above lemma with L = 3Kˆ and
δ0 = 3/8Kˆ, qh(x) is 3Kˆ-Lipschitz.
Proof of Theorem 4
PROOF. Coupled with the guarantee that with prob. ≥ 1 − δ,
Pr(||qp(x)−qh(x)||1 ≤
√
2∆) ≥ 1−∆, the assumptions guaran-
tee that with prob. ≥ 1− δ for the learned hypothesis h there must
exist a x′ ∈ B(x∗, ) such that ||qp(x′) − qh(x′)||1 ≤
√
2∆ and
there must exist x′′ ∈ B(x˜, ) such that ||qp(x′′) − qh(x′′)||1 ≤√
2∆.
First, for notational ease let γ denote
√
2∆. The following are
immediate using triangle inequality, with the results ||qp(x′) −
qh(x′)||1 ≤ γ and ||qp(x′′)−qh(x′′)||1 ≤ γ and the Lipschitzness
assumptions
||qp(x∗)− qh(x′)||1 ≤ K+ γ (optx∗)
||qp(x˜)− qh(x′′)||1 ≤ 3Kˆ+ γ (optx˜)
We call x˜TUqh(x˜) ≥ x′TUqh(x′) as equation opth. Thus, we
bound the utility loss as following
x∗TUqp(x∗)− x˜TUqp(x˜)
= x∗TUqp(x∗)− x˜TUqh(x˜) + x˜TUqh(x˜)− x˜TUp(y/x˜)
≤ x∗TUqp(x∗)− x′TUqh(x′) + x˜TUqh(x˜)− x˜TUp(y/x˜)
using opth
= (x∗ − x′)TUqp(x∗) + x′TU(qp(x∗)− qh(x′))+
x˜TUqh(x˜)− x˜TUqp(x˜)
≤ + (K+ γ) + x˜TUqh(x˜)− x˜TUqp(x˜)
using x′ ∈ B(x∗, ), optx∗
= ((K + 1)+ γ) + x˜TU(qh(x˜)− qh(x′′))+
x˜TU(qh(x′′)− qp(x˜))
≤ (K + 1)+ γ + 6Kˆ+ γ
using x′′ ∈ B(x˜, ) with Lipschitz qh, optx˜
B. EXTENSION TO STACKELBERG
GAMES
Our technique extends to Stackelberg games by noting that the
single resource caseK = 1 with T−1 targets gives∑T−1i=1 xi ≤ 1.
This directly maps to a probability distribution over T actions. The
xi’s with xT = 1−∑T−1i=1 xi is the probability of playing an action.
With this set-up now the security game is a standard Stackelberg
game, but where the leader has T actions and follower has T − 1
actions.
Thus, in order to capture the general Stakelberg game, for the ad-
versary, we assume N actions for the adversary (instead of T − 1
above). Then, similar to security games q1, . . . , qN denotes the
adversary’s probability of playing an action. Thus, the function h
now outputs vectors of size N − 1 (instead of O(T )), i.e., A is a
subset of N − 1 dimensional Euclidean space. The model of secu-
rity game in the PAC framework extends as is to this Stackelberg
setup, just with h(x) and A being N − 1 dimensional. The rest of
the analysis proceeds exactly as for security games for both para-
metric and non-parametric case, by replacing the T corresponding
to the adversary’s action space by N . Since, the proof technique is
exactly same, we just state the final results. Thus, for a Stackelberg
game with T leader actions and N follower actions, the bound for
Theorem 1 becomes
576M2
α2
log
8C(α/96N,H, dl¯1)
δ
It can be seen from the proof for the parametric part that the sample
complexity does not depend on the dimensionality of X , but only
on the dimensionality of A. Hence, the sample complexity results
from generalized SUQR parametric case is
O
( 1
α2
(log
1
δ
+N log
N
α
)
)
and for the non-parametric case, which depends on both dimen-
sionality of X and T , the sample complexity is
O
( 1
α2
(log
1
δ
+
NT+1
αT
)
)
C. ANALYSIS OF STANDARD SUQR
FORM
For SUQR the rewards and penalties are given and fixed. Let
the rewards be given and fixed r = 〈r1, . . . , rT 〉 (each ri ∈
[0, rmax], rmax > 0), and the penalty values are p = 〈p1, . . . , pT 〉
(each pi ∈ [0, pmin], pmin < 0). Thus, the output of h is
h(x) =
〈w1x1T + w2r1T + w3p1T , . . . ,
w1xT−1T + w2rT−1T + w3pT−1T 〉
where riT = ri − rT and same for piT . Note that in the above
formulation all the component functions hi(x) have same weights.
We can consider the function space H as the following direct-sum
semi-free product G ⊕ F ⊕ E = {〈g1 + f1 + e1, . . . , gT−1 +
fT−1 + eT−1〉 | 〈g1, . . . , gT−1〉 ∈ G, 〈f1, . . . , fT−1〉 ∈
F , 〈e1, . . . , eT−1〉 ∈ E}, where each of G,F , E is de-
fined below. G = {〈g1, . . . , gT−1〉 | 〈g1, . . . , gT−1〉 ∈
×iGi, all gi have same weight} where Gi has functions of
the form wxiT . F = {〈f1, . . . , fT−1〉 | 〈f1, . . . , fT−1〉 ∈
×iFi, all fi have same weight} where Fi has
constant valued functions of the form wriT .
E = {〈e1, . . . , eT−1〉 | 〈e1, . . . , eT−1〉 ∈
×iEi, all ei have same weight} where Ei has constant valued
functions of the form wpiT .
Consider an /3-cover Ue for E , an /3-cover Uf for F and
/3-cover Ug for G. We claim that Ue ×Uf ×Ug is an -cover for
E ⊕F ⊕G. Thus, the size of the -cover for E ⊕F ⊕G is bounded
by |Ue||Uf ||Ug|. Thus,
N (,H, dl¯1) ≤ N (/3,G, dl¯1)N (/3,F , dl¯1)N (/3, E , dl¯1)
Taking sup over P we get
C(,H, dl¯1) ≤ C(/3,G, dl¯1)C(/3,F , dl¯1)C(/3, E , dl¯1)
Now, we show thatUe×Uf×Ug is an -cover forH = E⊕F⊕G
Fix any h ∈ H = E ⊕ F ⊕ G. Then, h = e + f + g for some
e ∈ E , f ∈ F , g ∈ G. Let e′ ∈ Ue be /3 close to e, f ′ ∈ Uf be
/3 close to f and g′ ∈ Ug be /3 close to g.
Then,
dL1(P,dl¯1 )
(h, h′)
=
∫
X
1
k
k∑
i=1
dl1(hi(x), h
′
i(x)) dP (x)
≤
∫
X
1
k
k∑
i=1
dl1(gi(x), g
′
i(x))
+dl1(fi(x), f
′
i(x)) + dl1(ei(x), e
′
i(x)) dP (x)
= dL1(P,dl¯1 )
(g, g′) + dL1(P,dl¯1 )
(f, f ′) + dL1(P,dl¯1 )
(e, e′)
≤ 
Similar to Lemma 2, it is possible to show that for any probabil-
ity distribution P , for any function g, g′ dl¯1(g, g
′) ≤ |w − w′|
and f, f ′ dl¯1(f, f
′) ≤ |w − w′|rmax and e, e′ dl¯1(e, e′) ≤|w − w′||pmin|. Assume each of the functions have a range
[−M/6,M/6] (this does not affect the order in terms of M ).
Given, these ranges w for g can take values in [−M/6,M/6], w
for g can take values in [−M/6rmax,M/6rmax] and w for g can
take values in [−M/6|pmin|,M/6|pmin|]. To get a capacity of
/3 it is enough to divide the respective w range into intervals of
2/3, and consider the boundaries. This yields an /3-capacity of
M/2, M/2rmax and M/2|pmin| for G, F and E respectively.
Thus,
C(,H, dl¯1) ≤ (M/2)3
1
rmax|pmin|
Plugging this in sample complexity from Theorem 1 we get the
results that the sample complexity is
O
( 1
α2
(log
1
δ
+ log
T
α
)
)
D. ALTERNATE PROOF FOR GENERAL-
IZED SUQR SAMPLE COMPLEXITY
As discussed in the main paper we use the function space H′
with each component function space H′i given by wixiT + ciT .
Then, we can directly use Equation 2. We still need to bound
C(,H′i, dl1). For this, we note the set of functions wixiT + ciT
has two free parameters wi and ci, thus, this function space is a
subset of the vector space of functions of dimension two (two val-
ues needs to represent each function). Using the pseudo-dimension
technique [13] we know that for psuedo-dimension d of function
spaceHi we get
C(,H′i, dl1) ≤ 2(
eM

log
eM

)d
Also, we know [13] that pseudo-dimension is equal to the vector
space dimension if the function class is a subset of a vector space.
Therefore, for our case d = 2. Therefore, using Equation 2 we get
C(,H′, dl1) ≤ 2T (
eM

log
eM

)2T
Plugging this result in Theorem 1 we get the sample complexity of
O
(( 1
α2
)(
log(
1
δ
) + T log(
T
α
log
T
α
)
))
E. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Here we provide additional experimental results on the Uganda,
AMT and simulated datasets. The AMT dataset consisted of 32
unique mixed strategies, 16 of which were deployed for one pay-
off structure and the remaining 16 for another. In the main paper,
we provided results on AMT data for payoff structure 1. Here, in
Figs. 2(a) and 2(b), we show results on the AMT data for both the
parametric (SUQR) and NPL learning settings on payoff structure
2.
For running experiments on simulated data, we used the same
mixed strategies and features as for the AMT data, but simulated
attacks, first using the actual SUQR model and then using a mod-
ified form of the SUQR model. Figs. 2(c) and 2(d) show re-
sults on simulated data on payoff structures 1 and 2 for the para-
metric cases, when the data is generated by an adversary with an
SUQR model with true weight vector reported in Nguyen et. al [25]
((w1, w2, w3) = (−9.85, 0.37, 0.15) (ci = w2Ri +w3Pi)). Sim-
ilar results for the NPL model are shown in Figs. 2(e) and 2(f) re-
spectively. We can see that the NPL approach performs poorly with
only one or five samples as expectied but improves significantly as
more samples are added. To further show its potential, we modified
the true adversary model of generating attacks from SUQR to the
following: qi ∝ ew1x2i+ci , i.e., instead of xi, the adversary rea-
sons based on x2i . We considered the same true weight vector to
simulate attacks. Then, we observe in Figs. 2(g) (for payoff struc-
ture 1) and 2(h) (for payoff structure 2 data), that α approaches a
value closer to zero for 500 or more sample. Also, the NPL model
performs better than the parametric model with 500 or more sam-
ples. This shows that the NPL approach is more accurate when the
true adversary does not satisfy the simple parametric logistic form,
indicating that when we don’t know the true function of the adver-
sary’s decision making process, adopting a non-parametric method
to learn the adversary’s behavior is more effective.
(a) AMT Parametric Results
Payoff 2
(b) AMT Nonparametric
Results Payoff 2
(c) Simulated Data Payoff 1 -
Parametric results
(d) Simulated Data Payoff 2 -
Parametric results
(e) Simulated Data Payoff 1 -
Nonparametric results
(f) Simulated Data Payoff 2 -
Nonparametric results
(g) Parametric vs Non-parametric results on Simulated (for various
sample sizes) data from payoff 1 when the true adversary model
is different from the parametric learned function
(h) Parametric vs Non-parametric results on Simulated (for various
sample sizes) data from payoff 2 when the true adversary model
is different from the parametric learned function
Figure 2: Results on Uganda, AMT and simulated datasets for the parametric and non-parametric cases respectively.
